Analysis of retrial queueing models for the strategic access and equilibrium joining strategies of users in communication networks

Abstract

In classical queueing theory, if an arriving customer finds the server newlinebusy, the customers will either wait in the queue or leave the system forever and newlinethe waiting customers in line are served based on some queueing discipline. But in newlinepractice, the customers who left the system because of the waiting line will try for newlinetheir service after some random time. This retrial phenomenon is not taken into newlinethe account in the classical queueing theory. The best example of this type of queue newlineexists in telephone networks. When the telephone subscriber tries to make a call to newlineanother subscriber and if they get a busy signal, then, they quit the dialing at that newlinemoment; but after some time they will try to make a call to the same subscriber newlineand keep on trying until the call is connected. This type of queue is called and#8214; newlineRetrial Queuesand#8214; and the arbitrary waiting place is known as and#8214;Orbitand#8214;. This type of newlinequeue exists in telecommunication networks, computer networks, wireless newlinecommunication networks, manufacturing units, banks, ATMs, etc.. newlineChapter 2 studies the strategic access of single-server retrial queue newlinewith two types of customers, where priority is given according to their category. newlineBased on this concept, a cognitive-radio network is developed as a retrial queue with newlineenergy harvesting mechanism is also incorporated in it. Cognitive radio allows newlinefor a secondary user to opportunistically access the idle spectrum of a primary newlineuser (PU). Upon the arrival of a primary user, the service given to the secondary newlineuser by the cognitive radio is interrupted and the PU band is available for the primary newlineuser. After completion of service for the primary user, the PU band is again newlineavailable to secondary users. Performance metrics are derived to study the newlineequilibrium joining strategies of secondary users. A Stackelberg game is formulated newlineand Nash equilibrium is derived for the non-cooperative strategy of the secondary newlineuser. Game-theory concepts are incorporated with queueing theory ideas, newline